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Conceptualising unconscionability in Europe:
in the kaleidoscope of private and public law
mel kenny, james devenney and lorna
fox o ’mahony
1. Introduction
The aim of this project has been to explore particular conceptions of, and
responses to, unconscionability and similar notions, with speciﬁc refer-
ence to ﬁnancial transactions across Europe. Such an endeavour is
difﬁcult for at least ﬁve reasons.
First, the process can be obscured by the nuances of emphasis1 and
language2 both within jurisdictions and at a pan-European level.3 Secondly,
as the chapter byWaddams4 suggests, particular jurisdictionsmay choose, to
varying degrees, to respond (sometimes indirectly) to unconscionability
issues through a variety of devices rather than through an independent
doctrine of unconscionability. Thirdly, as we have suggested elsewhere,5
conceptions of, and responses to, unconscionability may be shaped by,
1 See, for example, R. Bigwood, ‘Undue Inﬂuence: “Impaired Consent” or “Wicked
Exploitation”’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 503 and J. Devenney and
A. Chandler, ‘Unconscionability and the Taxonomy of Undue Inﬂuence’ (2007) Journal of
Business Law 541.
2 See, for example, J. Elvin, ‘The Purpose of the Doctrine of Undue Inﬂuence’, in P. Giliker
(ed.), Re-examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment: Anglo-Canadian Perspectives
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) and the review thereof by J. Devenney,
(2008) Legal Studies 477 at 479.
3 M. Kenny, ‘Standing Surety in Europe: Common Core or Tower of Babel, (2007) 70
Modern Law Review 175 in particular at 180 ff.
4 Waddams, Chapter 2.
5 J. Devenney, L. Fox O’Mahony and M. Kenny, ‘Standing Surety in England and Wales: The
Sphinx of Procedural Protection’ (2008) Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
527 and J. Devenney,M. Kenny and L. FoxO’Mahony, ‘[The Protection of Non-Professional
Sureties in England and Wales]’, in A. Colombi Ciacchi and S. Weatherill (eds.), Regulating
Unfair Banking Practices in Europe: The Case of Personal Surety-ships (forthcoming, OUP).
See alsoM. Kenny and J. Devenney, ‘The Fallacy of the Common Core: Polycontextualism in
Surety Protection – a Hard Case in Harmonisation Discourse’, in M. Andenæs and
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for example, the social security and insolvency regimes within a parti-
cular jurisdiction.6 Fourthly, as Capper demonstrates, conceptions of
unconscionability may be dependent on context7 and, as Swain and
Fairweather8 clearly demonstrate, may vary over time. Indeed a week
after the conference upon which this collection of essays is based,
Lehman Brothers collapsed and the landscape of ﬁnancial transactions
and many of the assumptions underlying traditional approaches to the
protection of the vulnerable in ﬁnancial transactions was radically chal-
lenged; our perception of risk, attitudes towards regulation and under-
standings of risk may never be the same again. As Capper9 demonstrates,
even within particular jurisdictions conceptions of unconscionability
can be contested.10 Indeed Waddams thought-provokingly suggests
that unconscionability ‘has had multiple dimensions, and that it has
not been conﬁned to a single conceptual category’.11 This idea is elabo-
rated in Wightman’s approach to the neglected dimension of uncon-
scionability and the speciﬁc issue of transactional risk, where the
characteristics of particular kinds of transaction, in interaction with the
conduct of the parties, create unusual risk for one party.12 Transactional
risk is, as Rott and Halfmeier analyse, endemic in ﬁnancial services’
contracts.13
In this chapter we will seek to pull together some of the key issues and
themes which emerge from this collection of essays and the conference
upon which it is based. We will also comment on the challenges for
programmes of harmonisation in this area.14
C. Andersen (eds.), The Theory and Practice of Harmonisation (forthcoming, Edward Elgar
Publishing).
6 See also R. Parry, ‘The Position of Family Sureties within the Framework of Protection
for Consumer Debtors in European Member States’ (2005) 13 European Review of
Private Law 357.
7 See also J. Devenney and A. Chandler, ‘Unconscionability and the Taxonomy of Undue
Inﬂuence’ (2007) Journal of Business Law 541.
8 Swain and Fairweather, Chapter 8.
9 Capper, Chapter 9.
10 Compare, for example, P. Birks and Y. Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Inﬂuence’, in
J. Beatson and D. Friedmann (eds.), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1995) with Devenney and Chandler, ‘Unconscionability and the Taxonomy
of Undue Inﬂuence’, n. 1 above.
11 Waddams, Chapter 2. 12 Wightman, Chapter 6.
13 Rott and Halfmeier, Chapter 17.
14 See also J. Devenney and M. Kenny, ‘Unfair Terms, Surety Transactions and European
Harmonisation: A Crucible of Europeanised Private Law?’ (2009) Conveyancer and
Property Lawyer 295.
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2. Challenging private law elaborations of unconscionability
Public vs. private, common law vs. civil law?
A central issue which arises from this project relates to the respective
roles of private and public law in responding to issues of unconscion-
ability. Common lawyers would automatically tend to understand
unconscionability as a private law problem, as an exception to the
primacy of notions of freedom of contract. Traditionally at least, the
central place of freedom of contract led to the assumption that excep-
tions should be avoided, or at the very least restricted to the bare
minimum. Civil lawyers might more naturally tend to view equivalent
concepts to unconscionability such as good morals (gute Sitten) in
German law, good faith (redelijkheid en billijkheid) and mistake (dwal-
ing) in Dutch law,15 contractual unfairness as elaborated through doc-
trine, consumer protection and pre-contractual fraud (la re´ticence
dolosive) in France,16 as, in certain circumstances, relieving vulnerable
parties from the full play of their contractual obligations.
Yet why should freedom of contract continue to play such an impor-
tant and constricting role in the elaboration of unconscionability? Surely,
as Colombi Ciacchi challenges, a case can be made to fundamentally
revamp private law, to make the law relevant for the twenty-ﬁrst century
by ensuring a tangible freedom from unconscionable transactions rather
than a one-dimensional notion of freedom of contract. Indeed, in more
recent times the traditional private law approaches to ﬂeshing out the
content of unconscionability have been increasingly challenged; and all
European jurisdictions have had to ﬁnd ways to respond to this chal-
lenge. The challenge, as this volume demonstrates, has arisen on at least
three fronts: by public law/constitutional principles (fundamental
rights); attempts at European regulation (see in this connection, in
particular, Rott and Halfmeier on the MiFID); and the challenge pre-
sented to traditional private law approaches by broader exercises in
private law codiﬁcation (for example, the Common Frame of Reference
project).17 At this stage we can brieﬂy describe the three respective
challenges to the private law elaboration of unconscionability:
(a) Constitutional challenge: this is strikingly seen in the German
Constitutional Court’s decision in the Bürgschaft case, in which it
15 Cherednychenko, Chapter 13. 16 Saintier, Chapter 4.
17 See generally Kenny and Devenney, ‘The Fallacy of the Common Core’, n. 5 above.
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was held that courts were obliged to give effect to extensive sub-
stantive protection of family members against disproportionate
obligations in suretyship agreements on the basis of good morals.
The case shows the enormous ﬂexibility inherent in German con-
tract law to import or transplant constitutional principles: but also
begs the question of whether this truly represents the triumph of, or
the constitutionalisation of, German private law.18
(b) European regulation: for example, the tendency towards accommo-
dating contract law duties of care towards customers within regulatory
supervision rules, especially in ﬁnancial transactions, has been further
strengthened as a result of the adoption of the Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive (MiFID), described by some as Europe’s ‘new
constitution’ for investment services and secondary capital markets.19
A characteristic feature of the EC approach to investor protection is
its procedural nature and consequent reliance on the information
paradigm. Despite the objections to the model adopted in overstating
the capacity of consumers to process the information given, expanded
upon in Rott and Halfmeier’s contribution, the MiFID aims to protect
non-professional investors solely by procedural means: extensive
duties to inform, advise or warn the customer in combination with
the duties to know one’s customer and to assess the suitability of a
particular investment service or ﬁnancial instrument for the custo-
mer.20 As with the suretyship constellation, in the context of ﬁnancial
transactions consumers may simply not respond to such steps, no
matter how extensive the information given.
(c) Codiﬁcation: given the fragmentation of law which uneven patterns
of national private law and consumer protection across different
European jurisdictions have produced, a fragmentation further exa-
cerbated by the piecemeal, sectoral adoption of vertical instruments
of European regulation, can a case be made for the wholesale codi-
ﬁcation of European private law?
18 Rott and Halfmeier, Chapter 17 elaborating the German approach: Bundesgerichtshof
(BGH) ZIP Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 22 (2001), 189; BGH Juristische Schulung, 41
(2001), 606; BGH Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 55 (2002), 2228; BGH Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift, 55 (2002), 2230; BGH Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 55 (2002), 2634.
19 See, K. J. Hopt, ‘Grundsatz- und Praxisprobleme nach dem Wertpapierhandelsgesetz –
insbesondere Insidergeschäfte und Ad-hoc-Publizität’, Zeitschrift für gesamte
Handelsrecht und Witrschaftsrecht, 159 (1995), 135, 135; H-D. Assmann/U. H.
Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Cologne: Otto Schmidt, 2006).
20 See Article 19 of the MiFID.
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Furthermore, and evenmore subtly, if courts –whether common law or civil
law – make judgments about particular norms such as unconscionability or
equivalent concepts,21 can a pan-European concept of unconscionability
emerge indirectly through judicial harmonisation rather than through the
more invasive codiﬁcation exercise announced in the CFR initiative? Can
the emergent concept be inﬂuenced by a mixture of private and public law
concepts as elaborated in domestic case law? Smaliukas in his analysis
suggests that European private law regimes may indeed be more resilient
in their capacity to import or transplant legal doctrine than we may think;22
a point which Willett also alludes to in his chapter.23 As Cherednychenko
notes, to an extent the challenges which have arisen have at least
been accommodated within the private law: the Bürgschaft case can be
seen not simply as a case of constitutionalisation but also, if more subtly,
as a prime example of a more piecemeal judicial harmonisation of private
law. What is important with such judicial harmonisation is, ultimately, that
the results produced are similar and here, though the facts of the Dutch
and English suretyship cases were broadly similar, unlike in Germany, in
neither jurisdiction did fundamental rights play any signiﬁcant role.24
Constitutionalisation
The intervention of fundamental rights to protect the vulnerable family
member in the German Bürgschaft case25 represents at one level, as pre-
viously alluded to, a constitutionalisation of unconscionability; a valuable
assertion, as Colombi Ciacchi observes, of freedom from unconscionable
transactions. It comes as a qualiﬁcation of the traditional model which
looked to the fundamental importance of freedom of contract. Under the
‘constitutionalised’ approach, in cases where a structural imbalance in
bargaining power has led to a contract which is exceptionally onerous
for the vulnerable party, private law courts are obliged to intervene on the
basis of general clauses of good morals and good faith.26 Through the
21 See also Devenney and Kenny, ‘Unfair Terms, Surety Transactions and European
Harmonisation’, n. 14 above.
22 Smaliukas, Chapter 14. 23 Willett, Chapter 18.
24 See HR 1 June 1990, NJ 759 (Van Lanschot Bankiers v. Bink) and Barclays Bank plc
v. O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, for Dutch and English law, respectively. On these cases in
more detail, see O. Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the
Protection of the Weaker Party (Munich: Sellier, 2007).
25 BVerfG 19 October 1993, BVerfGE 89, 214 (Bürgschaft).
26 §§ 138(1) and 242 of the German Civil Code.
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interpretation of fundamental rights, the Constitutional Court in Germany
thus entered into the kaleidoscope of public and private law; into the
elaboration of contractual justice in modern contract law. By holding the
private law courts to be obliged to protect the constitutional rights of weaker
parties, the judiciary can thus be seen to be limiting the role played by
contract law in determining when a contract is unconscionable.
Cherednychenko criticises this approach: the interests of the vulner-
able party can be protected by several fundamental rights; a competition
between the applicable fundamental rights or Grundrechtskonkurrenz is
possible, begging in turn the question as to when the courts should
determine which fundamental right/s is/are applicable. Whereas the
German Constitutional Court in the Bürgschaft case provided relief on
the basis of the right to private autonomy in conjunction with the social
state, it would have been equally possible, as Cherednychenko suggests,
to argue the case on the basis of the surety’s right to family life within the
framework provided by Article 6(1) of the German Constitution.
Moreover, even when the Grundrechtskonkurrenz can be resolved, in
certain cases one and the same right can be used to support both of the
claims of the parties involved in the case. Consequently, the courts are
charged with resolving the conﬂict between the two fundamental rights.
In the absence of a clear hierarchy of fundamental rights, the only way of
doing this is by mediating or balancing the competing rights against each
other. Here, in the Bürgschaft case, the ‘conﬂict of fundamental rights’
arose between the surety’s right to private autonomy versus the bank’s
right to private autonomy. A balance had to be struck on the constitu-
tional level between the protection of the private autonomy of the
vulnerable and interference with the private autonomy of the stronger
party to the contract.
The major problem with this approach is that, as it is not clear which
outcomes should follow from the individual fundamental right, the
issue – unsatisfactorily – is simply left to private law courts to resolve.
In this regard, as Cherednychenko goes on to argue, it would have been
equally consistent with the Constitutional Court’s approach to the effect
of fundamental rights to uphold the original decision of the Supreme
Court in the Bürgschaft case: after all, it could be argued that the surety’s
constitutional right to private autonomy had been respected; every
person would have to have been aware of the risks involved.
But are we really dealing with the constitutionalisation of private law?
Surely, as Cherednychenko argues, is this not simply a case in which
judicial innovation has transplanted constitutional rights into private
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law analysis? Moreover, a comparable or at least equivalent result to the
Bürgschaft case was achieved, in the context of surety agreements, in both
England and Wales and the Netherlands on the basis of different con-
cepts within a traditional private law approach. Although in both Dutch
and English law the protection granted to sureties is limited to procedural
protection,27 the contract law of both legal systems also contains concepts
which can be resorted to in order to introduce substantive protection in
those cases where there is a gross discrepancy between the amount of
liability potentially faced by the surety and the ﬁnancial means of the
prospective surety at the time of the conclusion of the surety agreement. 28
Between the positions adopted by Cherednychenko and Colombi
Ciacchi, Teubner points to a subtle transformation of the notion of free-
dom of contract itself. Freedom of contract in a layered context of private
law instruments, doctrines and protective levels, becomes a much broader
concept: ‘While . . . freedom of contract was limited to the protection of
free choice in the market against fraud, deception, and . . . political inter-
ference, the new freedom of contract . . . extend(s) to a protection of
contract against the free market itself.’29 In this model the need to limit
autonomy, to respect a complex array of social expectations and third
party interests is accentuated, Teubner concluding that constitutional law
will play a mediating role in this hybridised, discursive contract law:30
‘[C]ontract as interdiscursivity raises . . . the issue of constitutional
rights . . . these rights can no longer be seen as protecting only the
individual actor against the repressive power of the state, but . . . need to
be reconstructed as “discourse rights” . . . The . . . correlate of contract as
translation would be an extension of constitutional rights into the
context of private governance regimes.’31 Yet the implications of such
27 For Dutch law, see HR 1 June 1990, NJ 759 (Van Lanschot Bankiers v. Bink). For English
law, see Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No. 2) [2001] 4 ALL ER 449.
28 J. Devenney, L. Fox-O’Mahony and M. Kenny, ‘Standing Surety in England and Wales’,
n. 5 above.
29 G. Teubner, ‘Das Recht hybrider Netzwerke’, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht and
Wirtschaftsrecht, 165 (2001), 550. English version: G. Teubner, ‘In the Blindspot: The
Hybridisation of Contracting’, available at www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/ifawz1/teubner/
dokumente/VERTRAG_eng_TheoreticalInquiries.pdf., at 14.
30 S. Weatherill, ‘The Commission’s Options for Developing EC Consumer Protection and
Contract Law: Assessing the Constitutional Basis’ (2002) 13 European Business Law
Review 497, O. Gerstenberg, ‘Private Law and the New European Constitutional
Settlement’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 766, H. Schepel, ‘The Enforcement of EC
Law in Contractual Relations: Case Studies in How Not to “Constitutionalise” Private
Law’ (2004) 12 European Review of Private Law 661.
31 Teubner, ‘In the Blindspot’, n. 29 above, at 18.
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constitutionalisation or quasi-constitutionalisation on the constitutional
democracy are, as Hirschl observes, massive and potentially pernicious;
launching a process in which lawyers intervene to insulate traditional
hierarchical patterns:
By keeping popular decision-making mechanisms at the forefront of the
formal democratic political processes while simultaneously shifting the
power to formulate and promulgate certain policies from majoritarian
policy-making arenas to semiautonomous professional policy-making
bodies, those who have disproportionate access to and have a decisive
inﬂuence upon such bodies minimize the potential threat to their
hegemony . . . the current global trend toward judicial empowerment
through constitutionalisation is part of a broader process whereby self-
interested political and economic elites . . . attempt to insulate policy-
making from the vagaries of democratic politics . . . [I]t can best be under-
stood as an attempt to defend established interests from the potential
threats posed by the voices of cultural divergence, growing economic
inequality, regionalism, and other centrifugal forces that have been given
a public platform through the proliferation of representative democracy.32
Constitutionalisation and harmonisation vs. regulation
and codiﬁcation
Given the legitimacy caveats regarding constitutionalisation, which can
perhaps be seen as a type of judicial harmonisation or innovation, can a
case be made for a more formal, regulatory harmonisation through
European secondary law or, even more radically, a comprehensive codi-
ﬁcation of European private law? Given the differences between Member
States’ ﬁnancial services’ laws, the Commission had, until September
2008, taken the view that improving access to credit, enhancing con-
sumer protection through responsible lending, and thus ‘promoting’
consumer debt and encouraging, in particular, the active consumer
could generate signiﬁcant economic growth. The aim of promoting the
depth, liquidity and dynamism in ﬁnancial markets so as to allow
for more efﬁcient resource allocation and enhanced competition33 was
32 R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy (Harvard University Press, 2004) at 217 (emphasis added).
33 Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005–2010) (COM(2005) 177 ﬁnal) at: http://ec.
europa.eu/internal_market/ﬁnances/docs/actionplan/index/green_en.pdf. Financial Services
White Paper 2005–2010: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ﬁnances/docs/white_paper/
white_paper_en.pdf. identifying EC objectives of an integrated, open, inclusive, competitive
and efﬁcient ﬁnancial market; removal of the remaining barriers to ﬁnancial services; high
levels of ﬁnancial stability; consumer protection; deepened relations with other global
ﬁnancial market places and globally enhanced European inﬂuence.
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also an aspect of the Lisbon strategy.34 To these ends, in 2002, the
Commission proposed the adoption of a new, maximum harmonisation
Directive on consumer credit.35 The Commission’s interest in the inte-
gration of the ﬁnancial services’market can be illuminated: extrapolating
from UK levels of secured and unsecured debt, there appeared – at least
up to the advent of the Credit Crunch – to be a potential for a European
debt market in excess of 13 trillion Euros.36
Increasingly, therefore, the question to emerge was not whether but
how a single ﬁnancial services’ market could be achieved: through selec-
tive measures of sectoral harmonisation or more adventurous measures
of ‘internal market’, maximum harmonisation. In this volume Rott and
Halfmeier examine the virtues of the sectoral approach to harmonisa-
tion. Moreover, even if the question as to the depth of harmonisation or
the feasibility of codiﬁcation can be resolved, what type of ﬁnancial
services’ regulation would recommend itself: the traditional Anglo-
American model of unregulated ﬁnancial services’ provision37 or a
more European model involving a higher level of consumer protection?
Alternatively, is the integration of the ﬁnancial services’ market best
left after all to less invasive, non-legislative, judicial harmonisation,38
to a competition of legal orders39 or to the market and spontaneous
34 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23–24 March 2000 (Lisbon
Strategy): http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm.
‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater
social cohesion’.
35 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisa-
tion of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning
credit for consumers, Brussels 11.9.2002, (COM(2002) 443 ﬁnal) Explanatory
Memorandum, Section 1.2. at 3: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/
2002/com2002_0443en01.pdf. Section 3, Explanatory Memorandum emphasising the infor-
mation paradigm, at 8: ‘The directive also covers surety agreements. The harmonisation
being sought for these agreements will centre mainly on the information to be provided to
consumers concluding such agreements, even if they guarantee credit that is granted for
employment-related purposes’.
36 In February 2006, the UK secured lending at GBP 981.8 bn and consumer credit at GBP
192.6 bn making a total indebtedness of GBP 1.174 trillion. For policy initiatives: www.
creditaction.org.uk/debtstats.htm and www.debt-on-our-doorstep.com.
37 C. McCreevy, DG Internal Market, Speech at Centre for European Reform, ‘Financial
Markets Integration’, London, 9 March 2006: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/
mccreevy/docs/speeches/2006-03-09/centreeureform_en.pdf.
38 A. Colombi Ciacchi, ‘Non-Legislative Harmonisation of Private Law under the European
Constitution: The Case of Unfair Suretyships’ (2005) 13 European Review of Private Law 285.
39 J. H.M. van Erp, ‘European Private Law: Post-modern Dilemmas and Choices’ (1999)
3 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, www.ejcl.org/31/art31-1.html.
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harmonisation,40 or is it best achieved through a mediation of claims
through a constitutionalisation of private law?41 Clearly, the scale of
intervention identiﬁed as necessary – whether substantive control or
the need for procedural rules and behavioural change to bank practice –
will inform the choice and location of measures to be adopted.
3. Key themes demarcating unconscionability
Across the range of topics and contributions covered in this collection, it
is possible to identify a number of key themes that emerge across the
‘unconscionability scholarship’ in the context of ﬁnancial transactions.
These key themes are vulnerability, risk and responsibility.
Vulnerability
Our perception of vulnerability and the adequacy of private law, regula-
tory and codiﬁcation responses aimed at protecting the vulnerable has
altered dramatically in the last months. Again, different legal orders have
focused on different categories as particularly vulnerable,42 for example,
whether consumer, family member or non-professional; and some of the
fragmentation of European approaches to unconscionability can be
attributed to these different and sometimes inconsistent demarcations
of vulnerability across legal orders.43
The understanding of unconscionability may also hinge on one’s
approach to freedom of contract, in particular on whether a freedom to
conclude contracts should be understood in a formal or a substantive
sense. This conﬂict goes to the heart of modern European contract
discourse between private autonomy and social justice, as alluded to
above – between the assertion of freedom of contract and the assertion
of the importance of fairness and solidarity in contract law; it shapes the
extent of the class of vulnerable contracting parties. Increasingly, as
Colombi Ciacchi observes, a new substantive understanding of freedom
of contract is emerging, requiring the judge to consider the contractual
40 A. I. Ogus, ‘Competition between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic
Analysis to Comparative Law’ (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 405.
41 O. Gerstenberg, ‘Private Law and the New European Constitutional Settlement’ (2004)
10 European Law Journal 766.
42 See generally, Devenney and Kenny, ‘Unfair Terms, Surety Transactions and European
Harmonisation’, n. 14 above.
43 Kenny and Devenney, 0The Fallacy of the Common Core’ n. 5 above.
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parity in the given case. Colombi Ciacchi points to a range of cases in
Germany, Slovenia, Greece and the Netherlands in which judges have
been asked to address the imbalance between the parties and to ensure
substantive freedom of contract. 44
Thus, the question Cherednychenko sets as to whether and to what
extent the weaker party must be protected against entering into highly
risky ﬁnancial transactions: should the ﬁnancial institution be obliged to
refuse to execute transactions where the transaction is extremely risky in
view of the customer’s ﬁnancial situation? Clearly this may lead to an
unstable deﬁnition of vulnerability: the customer’s solvency may be
irrelevant in determining his/her protection where the risk involved in
the investment is signiﬁcant. Alternatively, should the customer be able
to assume such risks subject to the condition that the investment ﬁrm, as
a more professional party, has fully explained the transaction, in parti-
cular by explaining the risks involved?45
Here Rott and Halfmeier’s critique is instructive: both the MiFID
Directive (2004/39/EC) and the German implementation of the
Implementing Directive 2006/73/EC46 adopt, in their view, far too
bank-friendly an approach to non-professional investment advice,
adopting an information-based solution towards kickback payments
rather than a substantive approach. Interestingly, a substantive ‘prohibi-
tion’ as used with medicines (Directive 2001/83/EC) was not adopted for
ﬁnancial services on the basis that there is no special vulnerability with
ﬁnancial advice, the investor being neither consumer nor vulnerable
towards another contracting party. However, Rott and Halfmeier analyse
the appropriate approach to protection by incorporating behavioural
ﬁnance research and disrupt the picture of the ‘well-informed consumer’
assumed by both the European and domestic legislator to be at the heart
of the transaction, concluding that ‘the disclosed information does not
help the investor to make a reasonable decision’ and that only substan-
tive protection is appropriate where conﬂicts of interest are responsible
for incentives to give inappropriate advice. The psychology of the context
may thus rephrase the traditional view of the invulnerability of the non-
professional investor.
Family members, meanwhile, would seem more naturally a vulnerable
group than non-professional investors; as the suretyship cases conﬁrm,
no amount of information will be liable to inﬂuence the family member
44 Colombi Ciacchi, Chapter 1. 45 Cherednychenko, Chapter 13.
46 Rott and Halfmeier, Chapter 17.
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in a meaningful way.47 This explains the intervention of fundamental
rights in the German Bürgschaft case48 in which an appeal that the
Supreme Court had violated the surety’s constitutional right to private
autonomy (Article 2(1) of the German Constitution) in conjunction with
the principle of the social state (Article 20(1) and Article 28(1)) suc-
ceeded. According to the Constitutional Court, in cases where a struc-
tural imbalance in bargaining power has led to a contract which is
exceptionally onerous for the weaker party, the private law courts are
obliged to intervene on the basis of the general clauses (§§ 138(1) and 242
of the Civil Code) on good morals and good faith. Thus, through the
interpretation of constitutional rights, the German Constitutional Court
entered into the discussion of contractual justice in modern contract law.
Constitutional rights were used to challenge the logic of private auton-
omy. By holding the private law courts to be obliged to protect the
constitutional rights of weaker parties, the Constitutional Court signiﬁ-
cantly limited the role played by contract law in determining whether a
particular contract is unconscionable. What is at issue in modern con-
tract law is therefore the extent of protection of weaker parties which is
necessary in order to address the present challenges arising from chan-
ging social and economic conditions of everyday life.
Last but not least, regulating the protection of weaker parties in some
areas by means of the conduct of business rules such as European
secondary law, exempliﬁed in the MiFID Directive, while leaving such
protection in other areas to private law – in particular where the private
law concept has been shaped by fundamental rights – may lead to
peculiar differences in the extent to which weaker parties are protected
in different ﬁnancial transactions. Thus, for example, as Rott and
Halfmeier observe, in German law family sureties enjoy substantive
protection against excessively onerous obligations while non-
professional investors are denied such protection altogether; in contrast
to the treatment of family sureties, where a potentially ruinous obligation
exceeding the surety’s ability to pay gives rise to the presumption of
immorality, no such consequences are attached to the fact that the
investor has entered into a highly risky investment transaction which
47 Kenny, ‘Standing Surety in Europe’ n. 3 above, in particular at 176 citing J. Gernhüber,
‘Ruinöse Bürgschaften als Folge familiärer Verbundenheit’ (1995) Juristenzeitung 1086,
at 1093: ‘Warnings and advice . . . are only useful where the addressee is prepared to
accept them’ (authors’ translation).
48 BVerfG 19 October 1993, BVerfGE 89, 214 (Bürgschaft).
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was highly disproportional to his ﬁnancial resources.49 In Dutch law, as
Cherednychenko elaborates, the concern for the effectiveness of the
ﬁnancial system has produced even odder results. While family sureties
enjoy only procedural protection by means of the information duties
incumbent on the bank,50 non-professional investors trading in deriva-
tives enjoy a combination of substantive and procedural protection
aimed at protecting such investors against themselves.51 The question
which arises in this respect, however, is whether non-professional investors
are more vulnerable in risky ﬁnancial transactions than family sureties.
Risk
It is generally accepted that ﬁnancial transactions carry risks.52 Until
recently, these risks have been valorised within neoliberal policy, with
exposure to risk accepted as part of the modern identity of consumers as
‘enterprising entrepreneurs’ – as ‘the bearer of risk who makes “choices” as
to which risks he/she will manage, to what degree, and by what provision,
and who must live with the consequences of the mistakes they make’.53
With ‘risk’ identiﬁed as the leitmotif,54 and neoliberal policies emphasising
the individualisation of citizens,55 individuals are presented as: ‘prudent,
rational, desiring to be responsible for themselves’.56 Within this frame-
work, protection for vulnerable parties has tended to operate at the
49 See, for example, BGH 8 May 2001, BGHZ 147, 343, 350; BGH 11 November 2003,
Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (2004), 24, 27.
50 See HR 1 June 1990, NJ 759 (Van Lanschot Bankiers v. Bink).
51 Cherednychenko, Chapter 13.
52 P. Bernstein, Against The Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (J. Wiley & Sons, 1996),
which provides a historical account of risk in ﬁnancial transactions; K. Byrne, ‘How
Do Consumers Evaluate Risk in Financial Products?’ (2005) 10 Journal of Financial
Services Marketing 21–36; H. Van Greuning and S. Brajovic Bratanovic, Analyzing and
Managing Banking Risk (World Bank Publications, 3rd edn, 2009).
53 M. Cooper, ‘The Inequality of Security: Winners and Losers in the Risk Society’ (2008)
61 Human Relations 1229 at 1233.
54 A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity
(New Delhi: Sage, 1992). See also A. Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’ (1999) 62
Modern Law Review 1.
55 N. Rose, ‘The Death of the Social? Reﬁguring the Territory of Government’ (1996) 25
Economy and Society 327; P. O’Malley, ‘Risk and Responsibility’, in A. Barry, T. Osborne
and N. S. Rose (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism and the
Rationalities of Government (London: UCL Press, 1996); P. Leonard, Postmodern
Welfare (London: Sage, 1997).
56 Cooper, n. 53 above, at 1234.
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margins, with what Williams describes as a (judicial) tendency to regard
‘unfairness in consumer ﬁnancial markets . . . as an exceptional transaction
that departs radically from an unproblematic norm’.57
Yet, within this model, two major contemporary challenges can be iden-
tiﬁed. On the one hand, the emergence of scholarship critiquing Giddens’
and Beck’s portrait of the ‘reﬂexive individual’58 has important implications
for the ‘value of choice’ theory delineated by Voyiakis in his analysis.59 This
account of contract law puts the contracting consumer in context, taking
account of the structures that frame people’s choices in respect of ﬁnancial
transactions, and proposing a more complex, ‘pluralist’ response.
Meanwhile, the global ﬁnancial crisis has demonstrated the way in which
the risks in the ﬁnancial system can potentially impact on all consumers,
and called into question the ‘overly optimistic view of self-regulating
markets’,60 informing much law-and-economics scholarship. Indeed,
even before the ‘credit crunch’, the relationship between risk, responsibility
and regulation had emerged as an important theme in UK policy,61 with
the growing reach of the FSA providing an example of the shift towards
growth in the use of regulatory approaches as a response to the risks
associated with ﬁnancial transactions. Yet the way in which risk is con-
ceptualised has also been transformed by the global ﬁnancial meltdown,62
with the suggestion that permissive regulatory conditions played a role in
creating the conditions for the crisis, leading to increased calls for funda-
mental reviews of the way in which ﬁnancial transactions are regulated.63
This theme is explored in several contributions. Nield’s analysis of the
new notion of unconscionability that has emerged through a range of
statutory provisions and regulatory responses to the risks posed to those
who borrow against the security of domestic property, raises questions
57 Williams, Chapter 12.
58 Cooper, n. 53 above; A. Aldridge, ‘Habitus and Cultural Capital in the Field of Personal
Finance’ (1998) 46 Sociological Review 1; V. Gillies, ‘Raising the Meritocracy: Parenting
and the Individualization of Social Class’ (2005) 39 Sociology 835.
59 Voyiakis, Chapter 5.
60 R. P. Malloy, ‘Mortgage Market Reform and the Fallacy of Self-Correcting Markets’
(2009) 30 Pace Law Review 79.
61 Better Regulation Commission, Risk, Responsibility and Regulation: Whose Risk is it
Anyway? (London: Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2006).
62 E. Heilpern, C. Haslam and T. Andersson, ‘When it Comes to the Crunch: What are the
Drivers of the US Banking Crisis?’ (2009) 33(2) Accounting Forum 99–113; V. Acharya
and M. Richardson (eds.), Restoring Financial Stability (J. Wiley & Sons, 2009).
63 M. Wolf, ‘Why the Credit Squeeze is a Turning Point for the World’ Financial Times 11
December 2007.
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about the way in which risk is conceptualised:64 for example, should
transactions which put one’s home at risk be regarded as ‘higher order
risks’, on the basis that the harms that may result from a ‘bad’ outcome
are particularly adverse? Across the range of papers, particular sets of risk
and different responses to those risks across the nodes of scholarship and
the various jurisdictions represented can be identiﬁed. For example,
Williams demonstrates how the risk of adverse consequences for con-
sumers, even where this risk is not actualised, has been sufﬁcient to
justify ﬁnes against providers of ﬁnancial products under the remit of
the FSA.65 From another perspective, Williams’ chapter also highlights
the emergence of a new methodology for addressing unfairness in
consumer markets, which recognises that fairness is contextually related
to the characteristics of the product and the parties.66 This approach is
rooted in recognition of the variable measure of risk posed by particular
products, to particular parties. Further, it makes a crucial connection in
identifying the relationship between the exposure of consumers to risk –
whether actualised in a ‘bad’ outcome or not – and adverse consequences
for ﬁnancial service providers.67
It is also valuable to note the debates concerning provision of adequate
and qualitative information in the tests seeking to identify unconscion-
ability in ﬁnancial transactions. Here, Cartwright emphasises the centrality
of information as part of a complex, multi-faceted conceptualisation of
‘unfairness’ within the context of ﬁnancial regulation, a theme which
resonates strongly with conceptualisations of the risk society as charac-
terised by the expansion of choice and the proliferation of information,
often in respect of an inherently uncertain future.68
However, it is also important to bear in mind that the party with whom
the potentially vulnerable consumer is transacting is in a stronger posi-
tion by virtue of being ‘the expert’ party. This issue is discussed in Viñals’
analysis, where she notes that consumers can be regarded as a weaker
party per se by virtue of their non-expert status, particularly in the
context of mass or standard form contracts.69 Viñals notes that ‘a mass
contract offered to a fungible contractor is drawn up by a class of experts
that depend on their technological background of knowledge’, thus
64 Nield, Chapter 10. 65 Williams, Chapter 12.
66 Ibid. 67 Ibid.
68 J. Ford, R. Burrows and S. Nettleton,Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A Social Analysis
of Mortgage Arrears and Possessions (Bristol: Policy Press, 2001) 6.
69 Viñals, Chapter 3.
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placing all consumers in a relatively vulnerable position as the weaker
party to the transaction. Yet, it is important to bear in mind the need to
balance the tensions between this type of vulnerability, and the need
to facilitate efﬁcient business practices through standard form contracts.
Cartwright also identiﬁes the problem of ‘information asymmetry’
between the consumer and the service provider as one of the catalysts
of regulation,70 with reference to the difﬁculties in putting into practice
the objective ‘average consumer test’ standard and in light of the FSA’s
recognition that ‘there is a lot more to do before information from ﬁrms
to consumers could generally be regarded to be fair and clear’.71
Meanwhile Zhou’s contribution looks to the rationale for the opera-
tion of the doctrine of unconscionability as being grounded both in the
asymmetry of information between the parties and the need to correct
the allocative inefﬁciency caused by the parties’ bounded rationality.
From an economic perspective, the choice of appropriate remedy
among the remedial options, as Zhou observes, depends upon the
emphasis placed by the lawmaker. If the lawmaker focuses on deterrence,
damages are the preferable option; if the major concern is the disincen-
tive to trade, then judicial modiﬁcation is the most suitable choice. If,
however, the lawmaker seeks to achieve some level of compromise, both
invalidation of contract and rescission are plausible alternatives.72
Furthermore, what is striking to Rott and Halfmeier is less the infor-
mational asymmetry than the prevalence of conﬂicts of interest affecting
ﬁnancial institutions’ ability to act in their clients’ best interests and
incentives embedded in current practice for advisers to give inappropri-
ate advice. The proceduralisation of risk in this context is simply unequal
to the task; instead, Rott and Halfmeier argue that to deal with the risks
inherent in investment contexts more substantive protection has to be
organised: to disallow inducements for investment advice, introduce fees
for such services and pattern regulation so as to divorce front-ofﬁce
investment advice from back-ofﬁce inducement-collecting.73 A similar pro-
blem, as Kalus and Habdas observe, seems to arise in practice with bank
loans in Poland; with banks employing a combination of economic, psy-
chological and legal securities to secure their lending, such that the borrower
needs to carefully consider which securities best reﬂect his/her interests.74
70 Cartwright, Chapter 11.
71 FSA, Treating Customers Fairly: Measuring Outcomes (London: FSA, 2007) 5.
72 Zhou, Chapter 7. 73 Rott and Halfmeier, Chapter 17.
74 Kalus and Habdas, Chapter 15.
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Moreover, viewing the evolution of legal responses to unconscionabil-
ity, Swain and Fairweather provided an account of the genesis of ‘uncon-
scionable conduct’ as behaviour that ‘shocks the conscience of the
court’.75 In reviewing the evolution of unconscionability against the
current global ﬁnancial crisis, it is interesting to reﬂect on how our
conceptualisation of the ‘normal’ levels of risk in ﬁnancial transactions
will provide important context for the development of unconscionability.
Finally, given the levels of risk and vulnerability identiﬁed in this volume,
and the capacity of unconscionable behaviour to shock the conscience of
the court one might begin to ask, as does Amato in her contribution,
whether the civil law is ultimately equal to the task of addressing such
behaviour. As Amato concludes:
civil liability remedies do not provide the only possible answer to the
protection of investors against unconscionable ﬁnancial contracts: in
addition, one can consider how alternative remedies subsequent to the
occurrence of damages (for example, stricter criminal penalties), preven-
tive measures (rules of conduct) or collateral sanctions (reputational
risks) may be able to support and protect investors more effectively
than civil liability rules.76
Responsibility
Another core theme to be drawn from these chapters relates to respon-
sibility: Who is responsible when the risks to which vulnerable consu-
mers are exposed are actualised, leading to harm? Who is responsible for
miscalculation of risk or bad outcomes? The relationship between risk
and responsibility is an important theme; Giddens has stated that ‘[r]isk
is . . . always connected to responsibility’;77 however, the neoliberal
perspective that tends to dominate in the UK typically emphasises the
self-responsibility of the individual consumer, rather than regarding the
provider of ﬁnancial services, or the state or legal system, as bearing
responsibility for the harms that may result when risks lead to bad
outcomes. Nevertheless, as the chapters which trace the growing regula-
tory role of the FSA and the OFT in the UK, including the growth in
mandatory codes of conduct, demonstrate, the model of absolute indi-
vidual consumer responsibility has come under increasing pressure.
Nield contrasts the theory of a ‘decentered regulatory approach’ under-
pinned by a mantra of ‘responsible lending and responsible borrowing’,
75 Swain and Fairweather, Chapter 8. 76 Amato, Chapter 16.
77 Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’, n. 54 above, 7.
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with evidence that, in practice, this model has clearly failed in both
respects.78
A central question is the appropriate allocation of responsibility
between the individual consumer or debtor who undertakes ﬁnancial
obligations within what Williams identiﬁes as the ‘responsibilised’ iden-
tity of a self-regulating market actor,79 and the provider of ﬁnancial
services, constructed as a ‘responsibilised ﬁrm’, also regarded as a ‘self-
regulating actor, entrusted with the governance of its own conduct’.80
Yet, Williams demonstrates a signiﬁcant development in the FSA’s
approach to such ‘responsibilised ﬁrms’, whereby they are required to
demonstrate the performance of fairness, not only in their ‘front end
dealings’, but in their routine business operations. Furthermore, it is
increasingly recognised that responsible behaviour on the part of ﬁnan-
cial institutions requires a contextualised approach, which recognises the
importance of distinguishing advice and products, on the basis of their
suitability for particular types of consumer. This issue has emerged
within the meaning of the FSA’s deﬁnition of unfairness – as ‘taking
advantage of the customer’ – and represents an important dimension in
the regulatory standard of responsibility which the FSA wishes to apply
to ﬁnancial services providers,81 although, again, it is recognised that
considerable work remains to be done before the goals of the FSA in
being able to implement and enforce the standards of fairness and
responsibility which it has conceptualised are achieved.
The difﬁculties in giving effect to standards of responsibility in the
context of ﬁnancial markets were recognised by Giddens in his seminal
paper on ‘Risk and Responsibility’.82 Giddens set out three models of
‘responsibility’, a term which he described as ‘an interestingly ambiguous
or multi-layered term’, which connotes (1) being the author of an event;
(2) acting in an ethical/accountable manner; and (3) obligation or liabi-
lity.83 The evolving approach to regulation of ﬁnancial services discussed
in several papers provides an interesting point of reﬂection on the shift
from ‘good practice’ approaches to ‘responsible lending, responsible
borrowing’, towards a more enforceable set of obligations and liabilities
to which ﬁrms are held to account, including by the levying of ﬁnes
where actions are deemed contrary to the standards of responsibility
required in dealing with consumers. Giddens noted, however, that in a
78 Nield, Chapter 10. 79 Williams, Chapter 12.
80 Ibid. 81 Cartwright, Chapter 11.
82 Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’, n. 54 above. 83 Ibid, 8.
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context where risk is viewed as ‘an energising principle . . . responsibility
can neither easily be attributed nor assumed’.84 Giddens went on to
suggest that this gives rise to the phenomenon which Beck described as
‘organised irresponsibility’, where ‘there are a diversity of humanly
created risks for which people and organisations are certainly “respon-
sible” in a sense that they are its authors but where no one is held
speciﬁcally accountable’.85 The difﬁculty, he argues, is how to allocate
responsibility for such risks: ‘Who is to determine how harmful products
are, what side effects are produced by them, and what level of risk is
acceptable?’86 Giddens predicted that:
Coping with situations of organised irresponsibility is likely to become
more and more important in the ﬁelds of law, insurance and politics, but
this won’t be easy to do precisely because of the rather imponderable
character of most circumstances of manufactured risk.87
It is clear that the degree of regulatory responsibility to which ﬁrms
involved in ﬁnancial transactions with potentially vulnerable consumers
are expected to comply is increasingly under scrutiny and that, while the
mantra of ‘responsible borrowing’ continues to impose expectations
on consumers as self-regulating market actors, which may present
particular challenges for vulnerable or marginalised consumers, the
expansion of regulation in recent years is expanding the standard of
responsible conduct required of ﬁrms, both in its breadth and in the
extent to which the FSA is willing to enforce standards of fairness
and ‘conscionable’ behaviour. Nevertheless, in the context of ﬁnancial
transactions, the question of responsibility is a complex, multifaceted
issue, which poses contextual challenges which the regulatory regimes
continue to grapple with.
4. Conclusions
A number of propositions emerge from this project. Perhaps the most
important are the caveats which we have introduced to the understand-
ing of European private law as a law possessing a clearly identiﬁable
common core, as a body of law amenable to a broad exercise in codiﬁca-
tion. Looking at the law in action, we ﬁnd substantial divergence rather
than convergence, and a picture of polycontextualism, legal fragmenta-
tion and tension. Amid the general mood of euphoria connected to the
84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid.
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Commission’s codiﬁcation exercise, it is important to stress the fact that
Europe’s private law can best be described in terms of a lack of common-
ality rather than by reference to an imagined, simplistic commonality.
As we have seen, the growing impact of public law on private law
relationships in the context of risky ﬁnancial transactions subjects the
role of private law in protecting the vulnerable against unconscionable
bargains to heightened scrutiny. The central issue to emerge is how the
kaleidoscope of public and private law approaches to the protection of
the vulnerable can be converged without sacriﬁcing the full autonomy of
private law to standards developed by public law. Here Cherednychenko
argues that it is only when there is a dialogue between public law and
private law that an advance in conceptualising unconscionability may be
achieved, and it is only with such a re-conceptualisation, providing new
and better solutions, that we will be able to protect the vulnerable in
ﬁnancial transactions.
Polycontextualism in Unconscionability
This survey has made clear that unconscionability involves a plurality of
parties and competing interests. The doctrine has a polycontextual
function, and the balancing or mediation of the interests involved
can take place at a number of levels and ﬁelds of law, for example in:
contract law (traditional defences: fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresenta-
tion); procedural protection (duties to inform of ﬁnancial risks);
consumer law (formal requirements and duties to inform); family law
(protection of family interests); insolvency law (regulation of rights of
recourse, symmetry of fresh start protection); constitutional law
(proportionality considerations); property law. The polycontextual func-
tion of unconscionability and the location of protective mechanisms
within this matrix of levels and ﬁelds of law affects both the level of
protection and the prevalence of different types of agreements. As we
have observed, this may lead to inconsistencies: for example, between the
level of protection offered the family surety on a fundamental rights basis
and the relatively low level of protection offered non-professional inves-
tors via European secondary law under the implementation of the MiFID
framework directive. In contrast, other legal regimes establish quite
different levels of protection for different categories of vulnerable con-
tracting parties. In the Netherlands, for example, the non-professional
investor enjoys substantive protection whilst the family surety must rely
on a quite different standard of procedural protection.
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The uncommon core
Whilst, at a basic level of abstraction common elements of unconscion-
ability can be recognised in all legal systems, the coherence of this picture
of commonality becomes fragmented the higher the level of abstraction.
Member States’ legal orders have their own demarcations and differen-
tiations, locating protection in different legal institutions and ﬁelds of
law. Even at a conceptual level the differences are striking: in the surety-
ship context, for example, either involving three parties in a two-
transaction agreement88 or a trilateral agreement.89 This leads to further
demarcational problems as between legal orders: thus whilst the creditor
may be seen in some legal orders as the professional (Germany), in others
he may also be a non-professional (Belgium and France). A major
distinction emerges in the balances struck between market-liberal form-
alism and interventionist, substantive approaches. The market-liberal
approach, underscores the central importance of freedom of contract
and allows the individual the freedom to enter ‘unwise’ obligations.
Meanwhile, the substantive approach focuses on the bargaining power
of the parties and the social implications of disproportionate guarantees.90
Whilst substantive analysis discloses the limits to the information model,
at its outer limit it appeals to the horizontal effect of fundamental rights.
Spectral analysis
A major reason for the uncommon core of European private laws lies in
the fragmentation of the contexts in which they operate; unconscion-
ability being correctly seen as an element or part of a wider spectrum, of a
layering of divergent protective mechanisms. Against this background,
standards of protection are ﬂeshed out in the framework of national
standards of consumer/debtor protection. This means that we need to
88 Two-transaction: underlying and unilateral contract. See generally, M. Siems, ‘No Risk,
No Fun? Should Spouses be Advised before Committing to Guarantees? A Comparative
Analysis’ [2002] European Review of Private Law 509 at 517; O. Cherednychenko, ‘The
Constitionalisation of Contract Law: Something New under the Sun?’ (2004) 8 Electronic
Journal of Comparative Law, www.ejcl.org/81/art81-3.html.
89 Art. 7:850(1) Dutch Civil Code, provides: ‘Suretyship is a contract whereby one party, the
surety, obliges himself towards the other party, the main creditor, to perform an obligation
to which a third person, the main debtor, is or will be bound towards the main creditor.’
90 U. Reifner, ‘Konsumentenkreditrichtlinie im Europaparlament – Zurück zu den
Siebzigern?’ (2004) Verbraucher and Recht 85. Current critique contained in a modiﬁed
proposal for a directive on credit agreements for consumers: www.responsible-credit.
net/media.php?id=1812.
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consider a number of legal institutions in comparing the level of protec-
tion of the vulnerable. In turn, this variety hinders the integration of a
European credit market. Moreover, social and behavioural factors can
play a decisive role in determining the real extent of liability. The level of
social welfare may inﬂuence the likelihood of default, whilst banking
practice will also inﬂuence the treatment of the vulnerable. As alluded to
above, legislators and judiciary have to ﬁnd the balance between compet-
ing interests in the law of polycontextual unconscionability: between
contractual security and the interests of guarantors; between family
and bank interests; between the parties’ rights in bankruptcy; and
between family members’ rights. In the following a cross-section of
national protection systems are charted.
Towards a unitary network
It can be countered that some commonality is present in the law on
unconscionability, but at a different level; that a type of uniformity
emerges from the tension at the heart of the uncommon core. If we can
understand unconscionability as the law of an interface or layering of
overlapping legal systems, then, whilst some elements may require uni-
form treatment, we can otherwise rely on a conﬂicts’ approach, competi-
tion and spontaneous harmonisation. In describing uniformity through
tension we have to change our perception of law. The central idea here is
that law depends on contradiction; that a multiplicity of systems can also
work as a unitary network, producing, as Teubner notes, a hybridised,
ambivalent unity: ‘[O]nly the combination of both sides of the
difference . . . brings out the special nature of the hybrid: neither media-
tion nor synthesis, but extremely ambivalent unity.’91
A tripartite approach?
Given its polycontextual function and uncommon core, an incremental
tripartite approach involving a combination of measures of (1) legislative
regulation, (2) non-legislative harmonisation admitting selective consti-
tutionalisation, and (3) non-legislative harmonisation (judicial conver-
gence) recommends itself for the required elaboration of the doctrine of
unconscionability in Europe. Despite calls for full-blown private law
codiﬁcation it is, in these authors’ assessment, unlikely that ultimately
91 Teubner, ‘Das Recht hybrider Netzwerke’, n. 29 above.
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anything more than selective, vertical measures of legislative harmonisa-
tion (EU secondary law) will be adopted in those narrow areas of func-
tional similarity where uniform law produces clear efﬁciency gains.
Whilst such areas, given the heterogeneity identiﬁed in this chapter,
will be rare, EU legislation could be important, for example, in ensuring
access to credit, establishing criteria for responsible lending or criteria
relating to community reinvestment initiatives along US lines.92 More
common will be measures of non-legislative harmonisation through
judicial convergence, a common law turn, and an effective, sensitive
and legitimate way of harmonising private law.93 Finally, in these
authors’ view the elaboration of unconscionability, inspired by the
German example, should admit selective constitutionalisation where
the fundamental rights of the vulnerable party require more substantive
and not merely procedural protection. Substantively, all that matters is
that the courts achieve the same results regardless of which norms,
doctrines or procedures they apply in order to come to this end. Such a
pragmatic approach, avoiding the superﬁcial attraction of codiﬁcation,
could, in Teubner’s terms, more effectively illuminate the ‘blindspots’ in
the elaboration of European unconscionability.
Finally, the virtue of such a tripartite strategy lies in its simultaneous
appeal to advocates of the uniform law and the unitary network, as well as
incidentally appealing to the ﬁnancial services industry and the European
executive, and in its acknowledgment of the interplay of private and public
in the kaleidoscopic concept of unconscionability in Europe.
92 Cf. US Community Reinvestment Coalition: www.ncrc.org.
93 A. Colombi Ciacchi, ‘Non-Legislative Harmonisation of Private Law’, n. 38 above.
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